

Collaboration in a Comprehensive Intervention: Working together in Analysis, Planning, Implementation and Evaluation

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ABSTRACT

In an effort to start bridging the gap between theory and practice, this paper seeks to provide an account of how the comprehensive approach could be applied in a complex intervention. The paper presents a single framework for how the comprehensive approach could be implemented: “the Comprehensive Intervention.” The Comprehensive Intervention-model functions as a structure against which collaboration has to be defined and facilitated in different ways. Using some generic steps – analysis; planning; implementation; and evaluation – the paper makes recommendations on how collaboration needs to be undertaken during the various stages of an operation to facilitate a comprehensive approach. The paper is based on research conducted by the Swedish Defence Research Agency, FOI, on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces and builds on a number of previous findings, including lessons learned from Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) and case studies of a variety of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) The starting point of the paper has been the military instrument and the “Comprehensive Intervention” carries strong denotations of military approaches. Nonetheless, the notion of a comprehensive approach inherently focuses us to look beyond such boundaries and focus on total outcome instead of the efforts of single actors. In short, the paper argues that becoming “comprehensive” is not as much a matter of the instruments and resources you apply as it is about the attitudes and approaches you adopt towards the operation and other actors throughout the development of an operation. The purpose of the paper is thus to provide a model that can be used to facilitate such attitudes within the armed forces and in doing so, enable the implementation of comprehensive approaches.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

We have come a long way in theorising about comprehensive approaches but less far in fully implementing these concepts. In discussions of why collaboration in comprehensive approaches is so hard to implement, a number of challenges and issues are often raised. These usually pertain to the differences in organisational cultures, ends, approaches, time perspectives, and a far from universal acceptance of the fundamental assumptions of comprehensive approaches. In this paper, the challenges to collaboration in a comprehensive approach are assumed to be known. Instead of focusing on these challenges, the paper thus focuses on presenting potential solutions to alleviate the problems associated with the challenges.

The Comprehensive Intervention-model is an attempt to start bridging the gap between theory and practice, as it tries to outline specific requirements and challenges to collaboration when implementing a comprehensive approach. The Comprehensive Intervention-model describes the environment and context in which a comprehensive approach-based operation is likely to take place and divides the operation into four dynamic stages throughout which collaboration is essential to ensure comprehensiveness – analysis, planning, implementation and monitoring/evaluation. The purpose of the model has been to provide an understanding of the larger strategic context that needs to be taken into account when, for example, developing the comprehensive approach within the Swedish Armed Forces.

This paper is based on research conducted by the Swedish Defence Research Agency on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces. The comprehensive approach, as depicted in Swedish concept development and experimentation, is a cross-government, multifunctional approach to Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The starting point of this research has been the military instrument and the “Comprehensive Intervention” carries strong denotations of military approaches. The notion of a comprehensive approach inherently forces us to look beyond boundaries and focus on total outcome instead of the efforts of single actors. This paper uses the development of an operation as a structure against which collaboration between the military and other actors has to be defined and facilitated in different ways to promote a comprehensive approach to a PSO. Given that the starting point of the paper is the military instrument, it could be argued that the paper is too militaristic – that it is failing to be comprehensive in describing the comprehensive approach. The author would argue that there is not *one* comprehensive approach but a range of comprehensive approaches. The contribution this paper intends to make is to raise awareness of the need to include other actors, as well as non-military approaches, when developing a comprehensive approach to operations within, for example, the Swedish Armed Forces. This promotes comprehensive thinking, but is not the be-all nor end-all to the comprehensive approach concept.

This paper brings together lessons learned from Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) – mainly from the Swedish Armed Forces’ participation in national and multinational engagements such as Multinational Experiment (MNE) 4, 5 and 6, demonstration exercises (such as DEMO 06), and Viking (Viking 08) – as well as from case-studies of a variety of PSOs. As such, it builds on a number of research projects and studies, case studies and experiment findings.

The paper is based on the report *Contextualising the Comprehensive Approach: The elements of a Comprehensive Intervention*, which was produced by the Swedish Defence Research Agency in 2008 and which summarised the above mentioned research, outlining the Comprehensive Intervention-model (Nilson et al., 2008). Since then a range of case studies of collaboration in PSOs and attempts at implementing joined-up approaches, which have verified the previous assumptions and highlighted additional challenges, have been made (e.g., Ekengard, 2009; Adolfo, 2010; Hull, Lindoff, & Lackenbauer, 2009). Data collection and synthesis of related policies, procedures and experiences from major international and regional organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the European Union, (EU), and NATO, has also provided a foundation for the recommendations and assertions expressed in this paper (e.g., Hanssen, 2011; Mac Dermott, 2009).

Since every situation is unique, this paper’s account of a Comprehensive Intervention is theoretically based. The Comprehensive Intervention-model is a normative framework rather than a structure that is currently being applied in practice. It should not be seen as a model for all contemporary PSOs but rather as a set of principles that should guide policy makers and practitioners in their analysis, planning, execution and evaluation of operations.

2.0 THE COMPREHENSIVE INTERVENTION ENVIRONMENT

Any contemporary military response to a conflict or crisis launched in a suffering region to stabilise and/or bring about change to the prevalent situation needs to be strengthened by, for example, political, developmental and humanitarian means and programmes. To denote the desire for better integration and coordination amongst these instruments, the term “Comprehensive Intervention” can be used to reflect the intent and potential application of the comprehensive approach concept. Even though the environment in which a Comprehensive Intervention will need to take place may differ greatly from one situation to another, some generic characteristics are likely to exist in most complex, multidimensional environments that require the application of a comprehensive approach.

The blue box in Figure 1 represents the time and space in which a military intervention takes place (e.g., a UN peacekeeping operation, an EU Common Security and Defence Policy/CSDP operation, a NATO Task Force, or any stabilisation and reconstruction effort conducted by a coalition of states). The military action is typically supported by political efforts (even though independent diplomatic efforts or political advocacy may also be ongoing) and possibly also police units. A military intervention will be initiated during a situation of deteriorating human, military, economic, and judicial security. It will be undertaken in order to achieve a specific set of objectives and it will be envisioned to be withdrawn and dissolved when the desired changes have been accomplished. The time and space in which a military intervention takes place also hosts a range of other, separate activities, for example, the above mentioned range of civilian efforts that are common to complex environments. While these are also “interventions,” they are more commonly referred to as “programmes”.

The civilian programmes may include development activities in the fields of poverty reductions, socio-economic development and support for effective and democratic institutions; independent political programmes such as diplomacy, mediation and reconciliation efforts; and/or humanitarian efforts led by international or national organisations as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs).




Figure 8 - 1: A military intervention and its environment

In most instances, these civilian efforts will both precede and succeed the time and space of the military intervention (i.e., they have established presence in the theatre before the military intervention has deployed and will remain there after the military intervention has departed). During the military intervention period some existing programmes will cease to operate, others will continue their undertakings, and yet others will commence their activities.

Some programmes may start to scale down roughly at the same time as our Comprehensive Intervention ends (e.g., humanitarian aid), due to an enhanced security situation. Others will remain in existence for a long time after the Comprehensive Intervention is dismantled (e.g., poverty reduction). Other forms of comprehensive approaches are desirable both preceding and succeeding the military intervention.

The civilian, long-term efforts are likely negatively affected by the deteriorating security situation. Hence, the military intervention must be viewed as *complementary* to these programmes, *facilitating* their delivery where possible. The intervention must find a way to relate to the existing programmes and actors, but the nature of the relationship will vary. The intervention must also take into account both the short-term and long-term effects of the actions undertaken during its implementation.

The blue box in the figure thus describes the need to apply a system-wide approach and the need for some type of coordination between the activities existing inside the box: the need for a Comprehensive Intervention.

3.0 COLLABORATION IN A COMPREHENSIVE INTERVENTION

Any Comprehensive Intervention will need to go through the basic steps common to any strategic process: analysis; planning; execution/implementation; and monitoring/evaluation.

The four steps express the relationship between high-level strategies, intervention planning and field-level coordination. With a comprehensive approach outset, collaboration is essential throughout the whole of this process – from strategic analysis to decisions on desired outcomes and the choice of instruments, and to operational functional planning and deciding on specific activities to manage the crisis, including monitoring and evaluation.

Collaboration in support of a comprehensive approach is necessary to each step. All steps are mutually reinforcing. Without consistently applying a comprehensive approach to all steps, collaboration in support of the others will be more likely to fail.

3.1 COLLABORATION IN COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS

All planning approaches rely on thorough input in terms of information about the current situation. Sufficient analysis and assessment of a situation entails the development of a shared understanding amongst the planners regarding the nature of the given situation, as well as the opportunities at hand. Rigid processes that emanate from a single domain (e.g., the military) do not allow for the inclusiveness needed (MNE 5, 2008).

Traditionally, analysis for PSOs tends to at best be a combination of inputs rather than a collaborative analysis of different inputs (World Bank 2006). For a comprehensive approach, true collaboration in analysis is needed. A benefit of collaborative analysis is that it tentatively provides an opportunity for dialogue among disparate actors (MNE 5, 2008). This promotes mutual understanding of the different perspectives, approaches and activities of other actors. Ideally, it could also lead to subsequent integration or facilitate coordination of planning, implementation and evaluation. Depending on the organisational context and the actors involved, the methodology for analysis varies significantly. It is therefore essential to design and apply analysis methodologies that constitute a mix of different processes and inputs without merely compiling already established analysis.

In Comprehensive Analysis, none of the participants will individually have access to all the information required to ensure that the analysis is properly conducted. In such situations it is essential to establish an analytical structure in which all inputs can be constructively assimilated. To achieve this, transparency in the analytical systems that allow individual participants to actively share their input in, for example, brainstorming formats can be useful (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2009).

Combining the different methodologies for analysis that might be used by the various organisations seeking to be engaged in a comprehensive approach is challenging (World Bank, 2006; MNE 5, 2008). CD&E efforts indicate that relatively straight-forward and sector-neutral overlay methodologies – based on for example simplistic questions or checklists – which allow different actors to provide inputs based on their own respective approaches, are key in creating a shared understanding (MNE 5, 2008).

In multifunctional environments it is impossible to command the relevant participants into contributing to collaborative analysis. Nonetheless, the analysis process will need to be facilitated by some sort of leader, directing and guiding the process. Rather than being that of an instructor, the role of this facilitator should aim to ensure that the knowledge of the individual participants in the collaborative analysis is constructively used and to generate consensus, not so much as regards the analysis, but as regards the need for a collaborative analytical process (Grönberg, Ring, & Persson, 2009).

Inputs to collaborative analysis may range from expert participation to reviews of frameworks and plans of other actors. A stakeholder analysis, in which different actors are assessed in terms of the relevance to and degree of support of the intervention, is one of the important areas of analysis that requires this type of input (MNE 5, 2008).

In addition, Comprehensive Analysis needs to be undertaken in a joint effort between the strategic and field levels. CD&E has shown that strategic-level analysis cannot simply be passed on to lower levels of planning without making sure that core assumptions are shared with those that are closer to the field (MNE 5, 2008). Comprehensive Analysis should ideally also include the perspectives of various local actors. The need for a joint understanding of the situation is both horizontal and vertical in a Comprehensive Intervention.

3.2 COLLABORATION IN COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING

Planning is the agreement on the ends, ways, and means of the intervention. As for analysis, planning approaches and methodologies vary significantly, depending on the organisational context and the actors involved. The Comprehensive Intervention-model is based on the assumption that a high degree of coordination and cooperation is achievable in planning. The main challenge to comprehensive planning is how to get the right actors with the right authority to the planning table. A main issue in this is to help establish an understanding that collaborative planning is a project worth investing in.

Planning with a comprehensive mindset is important to achieve consensus amongst relevant actors regarding what the overarching aim of the intervention should be. Planning is a way to translate strategic direction into action, transitioning far-reaching visions and end-states into concrete plans. Both research and lessons from CD&E indicate a high relevance and importance of joint, multifunctional implementation planning for both “filling in the blanks” and achieving better strategic linkage, agility and coordination prospects (Smith, 2004). Such processes set the scene for actual agreement and coordination of ends, ways and means, as well as providing the foundation for the requisite long-term thinking needed in contemporary crises management and peace-building. To make the best use of the information flows and input from both strategic level and field level, comprehensive planning should be dynamic, allowing for bottom-up input and adjustments, and ongoing throughout the scope of the engagement (MNE 5, 2008). Joint monitoring and evaluation is in this respect imperative.

The many actors operating in a crisis zone have their own plans for carrying out their individual mandates. Already existing plans and programmes in the intervention environment should be considered a core input when planning for a Comprehensive Intervention in an effort to support and be reinforced by the activities of the other actors.

To accommodate the different time-perspectives and focus of actors in or outside the intervention, collaborative planning must allow for different maturity and different types of inputs to planning (Lindoff et al., 2008). There is often an asymmetry of resources available for planning amongst the various actors that will need to be engaged in collaborative planning. As a result, all actors will have to engage in planning with an open mind-set. No single method for planning will fit everybody. The most central issue is the need to reach an agreement on overarching outcomes that subsequent “actor-specific” planning can use as a framework for planning.

Comprehensive planning can be seen as a framework for connecting different plans towards a set of high-level outcomes. Every outcome might not be affected by every actor; indeed, some outcomes may be envisioned to occur after some actors have left the area. For instance, the military term “end-state” has proven to be problematic in multi-actor environments as the military end-state is likely to occur long before development or state-building efforts, for instance, are sustainable. Therefore, it is proposed that military forces should not only focus on the end-state but also consider longer-term actions and programmes implemented by other actors and the effect that these will have when planning for Comprehensive Interventions. The important thing here is to keep a long-term, multifunctional focus in the planning phase. If outcomes are agreed upon, then it will also be easier to identify supporting-supported relationships (i.e. where one actor might be ‘lead’ for achieving one outcome, other actors might be able to support).

To conduct this proposed multifunctional implementation planning there is a need to find “forums” that are acceptable to actors from different countries, organisations and instruments, and that are able to create incentives for coordination. The United Kingdom’s (UK’s) Stabilisation Unit’s approach to planning is one example of in-theatre implementation planning that brings together actors from defence, development and diplomacy, in order to create a shared plan and strategy for the UK in complex environments. Building on the experiences from similar efforts, together with CD&E within MNE 5, some general traits of such a forum have been established (MNE 5, 2008):

- There is a huge need for flexible methods and inclusiveness. If actors do not feel that they can affect the discussions, then they will have very little incentive to stay in the forum.
- A planning team with skilled facilitators encompassing multi-domain familiarity is highly valuable. The planning team should be small (3-5 persons) and should be seen by the other actors as neutral (i.e. not favouring any of the involved actors).
- The planning process needs to be iterative in that it should allow continuous dialogue between the different levels (strategic, operational and field) to ensure that planning is responsive to changes in the environment. In complex, multi-actor environments it will not be possible to create plans that will be relevant throughout the course of a Comprehensive Intervention.
- Planning for in-theatre coordination, as well as monitoring and evaluation, is of great importance.

3.3 COLLABORATION IN COMPREHENSIVE EXECUTION

Any comprehensive intervention needs a range of mechanisms for collaboration at the field level. The nature of multifunctional interventions requires these to be flexible and to avoid a “one size fits all” approach. Different organisations have different criteria for what effective collaboration looks like. There is no single model for how collaboration in implementation should be conducted.

Successful comprehensive implementation arrangements tend to include a high degree of ad hocism. Whilst not always desirable, such approaches can be positive since they are generally designed to meet specific field-level needs (Hull, 2008). For coordination mechanisms to fulfil such flexibility the decision-making authority needs to be decentralised to fieldlevel – facilitating swift and appropriate responses in tune with the situation at hand (Derblom, Hagström-Frisell, & Schmidt, 2008).

A range of measures and mechanisms supporting comprehensive approaches and promoting collaboration in the field have proven effective in more than one situation; one example is the mechanism for regulated information exchange (Derblom, Hagström-Frisell, & Schmidt, 2008). Where actors and organisations are willing and able to partake in a comprehensive approach, a range of mechanisms can facilitate collaborative implementation:

- *“One Office.”* One source of in-theatre political direction for all in the form of a joint office. The most mature model of implementing such a “common office” is the UN concept of Integrated Missions (IM), which integrates the entire UN system in a given country under the authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), mandated to coordinate all UN activities (United Nation Security Council, 2003).

- *Co-location of offices.* Co-location of field offices can, where a unified office is not possible, facilitate at least a geographical centre from which political and strategic direction is given. Co-location can facilitate better multifunctional coordination by enabling regular personal consultations and institutional contacts between various actors, including relations with the local population (Berhana, 2009).
- *Joint Coordination bodies and forums for information exchange.* Formal forums (i.e., regular meetings with stipulated agendas), informal settings (e.g., IT-networks) and the use of liaisons can all help bridge boundaries between organisations and help these share information (DeConing, 2007; Lipson, 2005; Van der Kleij, 2010). In addition, mapping systems tracing the geographical distribution of interventions and programmes, such as “Who does What Where” systems¹, are important in any comprehensive intervention since they serve as a starting point for coordination by making information, which would otherwise not be accessible by all, publicly available.
- *Common implementation plan and reliance on common frameworks.* Even successful comprehensive pre-deployment planning is unlikely to have included all relevant actors which need to be coordinated with in the field. Common implementation plans, listing the main activities of all major organisations in a mission area, has proven an effective way of delineating each actor’s area of responsibility, avoiding overlap and strengthening collaboration.² Such plans should be adaptable and flexible in the face of the mission environment as the situation on the ground can change rapidly.
- Where joint implementation is not possible, reliance on common frameworks may still assist in promoting coherence. Many civilian actors, particularly humanitarian and development actors within the UN family, work in accordance with a few key strategy and planning documents, including a series of frameworks for reconstruction, development and other efforts of assistance actors.³ Such frameworks will exist in any intervention environment and a Comprehensive Intervention should seek to tap into these and coordinate in accordance with these strategies.
- *Joint Communication Strategies.* The joint coordination of press and information activities may also be useful to formulate and distribute joint messages to support the overall objectives of the mission.
- *Pooling of resources and cells for common action.* Mechanisms that allow for pooling of resources play a crucial role in a Comprehensive Intervention. Examples of this include the UN’s Joint Logistics Operation Centres (JLOC), which function as the coordinating body for logistical support to UN entities (UNDP). The JLOCs provide an opportunity to conduct joint planning and preparation for joint operations and facilitate cooperation on logistics and support issues. They facilitate the joint use of seaports, for instance, and coordinate logistical support from and to all mission components as well as humanitarian organisations on the basis that the logistics support is consistent with mission objectives (United Nations General Assembly, 2006). Similar functions that allow for pooling of resources are important features of sustaining comprehensive approaches.

3.4 COLLABORATION IN COMPREHENSIVE MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Any PSO should be seen as a continuous cycle – ranging from analysis, through planning and execution and, lastly, evaluation, with ongoing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) to support the other phases throughout an intervention. As in previous phases, a comprehensive approach is vital for successful M&E because M&E performed by one single actor, evaluating one programme or project, can only tell a limited part of the story and might prove to be of little use when working in multi-actor operations with broad and complex

¹ The 3W system (Who does What Where?) is usually hosted by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

² Examples include the joint United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for Liberia.

³ These include, for example, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Post-Conflict Needs Assessments, Common Humanitarian Action Plans and the “cluster approach” of the UN.

objectives. However, comprehensive M&E is not easy. Evaluation of the impacts and outcomes of a single sector programme is difficult enough, given the far-reaching and intangible aims of contemporary operations (stabilisation, democratisation, economic development, etc); when one tries to do this in a comprehensive manner the challenges are even greater.

The evaluation itself is made difficult because of the need to measure abstract objectives that involve diffuse outcomes such as “stability” and “sustainability.” Different attempts have been made over the last years to help evaluators with this predicament. For example, the US government has funded a project called Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) to increase its ability to measure outcomes instead of outputs in conflict transformation and stabilisation (e.g. to help planners to produce and articulate relevant and measurable objectives in multifunctional operations).⁴ The MPICE framework is a comprehensive catalogue of goals, indicators and measures for evaluators to use. It focuses on five sectors or end-states essential to the resolution of conflict: stable governance, safe and secure environment, rule of law, sustainable economy, and social well-being (DoD et al., 2008). Even though this framework is promising it has also been criticised for consisting of too many indicators, making the framework difficult to use. In an attempt to provide practitioners in the field with methods and tools that are easy to use, a NATO research group (HFM-185) has been established. Part of the group’s effort includes the development of a small number of generic core variables, approximately 30, that can be used as indicators of conflict dynamics in the five sectors previously mentioned.

Attempts are also being made by other actors. Donors around the world are trying to streamline evaluation processes in order to enhance effectiveness in the area of evaluation. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has developed evaluation guidelines that many donors look to for direction (Frelin, Tejpar, & Nilsson, 2010). A few years ago, OECD/DAC highlighted the gap between donor policy and actual outcome on the ground within the area of conflict prevention and peace building and pointed to the fact that the lack of coherence amongst donors and the lack of common strategic guidance heavily contribute to this problem (OECD, 2008).

Given the gaps between donor intentions and outcomes in the field, coordination problems, and newly emerging aid instruments (especially in the security sector), donors should continue considering how best to adopt more coordinated and “whole of government” approaches to evaluation itself. For instance, when planning evaluation strategies or calendars it is important to plan not only to cover individual peace-building activities but to look at overall contributions to peace both in and across conflict areas. (OECD, 2008)

OECD/DAC emphasises that M&E can not be done by different actors in isolation from each other, but rather, there needs to be a comprehensive approach where the evaluation of a specific program is related to the overarching goal (e.g., a sustainable peace). The argument is not that all actors should commit to one grand evaluation model, but rather that agreed objectives and an agreed baseline for evaluation of outcomes would increase effectiveness in comprehensive interventions and ensure that M&E tells a more comprehensive story than before. There are few, if any, frameworks for M&E in the area of PSOs that have proven to be efficient in contemporary operations (OECD, 2008).

If a “multifunctional” evaluation framework could be produced, it would allow evaluators from different sectors to perform their sector-M&E while the “intervention” could glean insights from several efforts through effective information sharing. This will of course be challenging. Practically, it will involve practitioners and evaluators from a wide range of policy areas, presumably with limited knowledge of each others’ processes, terminology and culture. Furthermore, as conflict M&E is an underdeveloped field, there are few methods to turn to. Thus, a first step is to cater to the need of developing methods for multifunctional M&E that are adaptable to the specifics of the situation at hand.

⁴ The MPICE (Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments) project is a Department of Defense (DoD), USAID and US Army jointly funded initiative to improve measurements in PSOs.

4.0 CONCLUSION

This paper has mainly introduced a number of ideas aimed at facilitating a comprehensive approach by describing a structure against which collaboration can be defined. As a first attempt to start bridging the gaps between theory and practice it has only reached so far in trying to describe how a comprehensive approach could be implemented.

The Comprehensive Intervention-model is a normative framework rather than a structure. In many ways it is not even a model but a set of principles that should guide the implementation of a comprehensive approach. As regards actual implementation, most questions remain unanswered (e.g. which people should we include in comprehensive analysis and how do we arrange for comprehensive planning?). Above all, the question of who should be in charge of ensuring the achievement of multifunctional and comprehensive approaches still remains unanswered.

The main challenge in trying to implement a comprehensive approach is that it is just that – an *approach*. It is primarily a mindset. As such there is no final recipe for a Comprehensive Intervention. Rather, there will be as many recipes as there are actors relevant to the intervention.

The lack of lucidity is in many ways both a strength and a weakness of the concept. As argued previously, a certain degree of ad hocism is necessary to avoid a “one-size-fits-all” approach. As we seek various ways of managing the specifics, a first step – as well as perhaps the number one challenge – is simply to generate awareness of the benefits of working together.

The comprehensive approach is based on collaboration between diverse actors. The people who need to be engaged in the comprehensive approach cannot be convinced to do so by means of authority, or command and control, as such authority does not exist. Instead, encouraging the comprehensive approach is one of the main “hearts and minds” operations that are currently being undertaken. Promoting a general understanding of “what’s in it for me” can help overcome organisational obstacles to collaboration by encouraging each one’s best effort. The way ahead lies primarily in convincing all relevant actors that a comprehensive approach is an effort worth investing in.

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